WWIII Risk Model — Global Conflict Risk Estimate
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Deep-dive into Game Theory Prediction Model

DISCLAIMER

Educational scenario analysis based on official, public data with transparent assumptions. It is not a forecast of certain war and should not be read as a claim that any named country, institution, or person will initiate conflict.

How the game theory conflict prediction model works

The model asks a simple question: In each country, when are conditions in place that the most powerful people are economically incentivized to encourage war and geopolitical conflict?

It covers all UN member states starting in 2026 and projects forward one year at a time for up to 30 years. Each year, the model tracks:

  • AI rollout impact on productivity
  • White-collar labor slack
  • Governance weakness and elite capture
  • Social pressure on governmental change
  • Worker coordination capacity
  • Ultra wealthy insulation from geopolitical conflicts
  • The cost or constraint on harmful escalation

A country reaches the "war" threshold when the most powerful people no longer seek to produce new goods, but instead engage in conflict-seeking behavior as part of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Reaching the threshold does not mean a country will start a war — it means the country is modeled as more likely to amplify an existing crisis under stress.

The model in plain terms

Each country has specific variables that we care about with specific impacts:

Higher AI impact (a)
Makes productive investment more attractive
Higher replaceability (d)
Makes workers more economically vulnerable
Higher governance weakness (g)
Makes harmful elite behavior easier
Higher social pressure × organization (p×s)
Increases the importance of organized social conflict
Higher elite insulation (e)
Means the ultra wealthy are insulated from economic pain
Higher conflict deterrence (Cw)
Stronger constraints against the conflict-seeking strategy

AI is used to estimate each country's variables for every given year simulated in the model.

Interactive country risk simulator

Adjust the sliders below to see how the game theory model responds for a hypothetical country. These variables are scaled from 0 to 1 as model indices not percentages. The model checks whether productive investment remains the dominant strategy for the most powerful economic actors (the ultra-wealthy) — or whether conflict-seeking becomes rational.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
0.40

How much AI is reshaping jobs and productivity. Higher = AI is transforming the economy faster, making productive investment more attractive.

AI economic impact slider, current value displayed above
0.40

How easily workers can be displaced. Higher = more labor slack, less worker bargaining power, which can cut both ways.

Worker replaceability slider, current value displayed above
GOVERNANCE & POWER
0.40

How weak or captured by elites are the country's institutions. Higher = more elite capture, weaker rule of law.

Governance weakness slider, current value displayed above
0.35

How shielded the ultra-wealthy are from conflict's costs — via offshore assets, private security, and political immunity. Higher = more insulated.

Elite insulation slider, current value displayed above
0.50

How strong are the legal, institutional, and international barriers against conflict. Higher = stronger deterrence, more cost to pursuing war.

Conflict deterrence slider, current value displayed above
SOCIAL DYNAMICS
0.40

How much economic strain and inequality are driving instability. Higher = more pressure on the government to respond.

Social unrest pressure slider, current value displayed above
0.35

How well workers can coordinate and push back collectively. Higher = stronger unions, civic capacity, and collective action.

Worker organization slider, current value displayed above
MODEL OUTPUT
Social mobilization force (p × s)
Combined effect of unrest pressure and worker organization
Productive investment margin A)
Advantage of productive investment when workers adapt — positive = investment still wins
Productive investment margin under resistance R)
Same margin when workers organize — positive = investment still wins
Nash equilibrium
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ULTRA WEALTHY PAYOFF MATRIX
Worker adapts (A)Workers resist (R)
Invest productively (M)
Seek conflict benefit (W)

Higher values are better for the ultra wealthy. When W payoffs exceed M payoffs, conflict-seeking becomes rational.

What "war" threshold countries and "high-risk areas" mean

"War" threshold countries are those with pure strategy equilibrium where the ultra wealthy (those in power) have economic incentives to encourage war or geopolitical conflicts (W). "War" threshold countries are better understood as possible conflict amplifiers due to the state fragility, conflict exposure, labor stress, governance weakness, elite insulation, and/or geopolitical pressure in the country. In other words, the near-term risk still comes mainly from existing wars, ceasefire failures, maritime chokepoints, alliance obligations, and spillovers across energy, food, migration, and cyber systems.

High-risk areas are areas where "war" threshold countries exist. Simply put, they are regions where one or more countries with incentives to stir up conflicts exist and should be closely monitored going forward.

High-risk areas: countries already at the "war" threshold in 2026

Middle East & surrounding zone
Iran · Iraq · Lebanon · Libya · Syria · Yemen · Pakistan · Turkmenistan

One of the clearest high-risk belts — combines active or recent conflict, regional rivalry, energy routes, outside-power involvement, and high spillover potential.

Sahel, Horn of Africa & wider African fragility belt
Algeria · Angola · Burkina Faso · Burundi · Cameroon · Central African Republic · Chad · Congo (DRC) · Congo (Rep.) · Djibouti · Equatorial Guinea · Eritrea · Ethiopia · Guinea · Mali · Mauritania · Mozambique · Niger · Nigeria · Somalia · South Sudan · Sudan · Zimbabwe

The largest concentration of war-threshold countries in the model. Local instability can spread through migration, commodities, armed spillovers, governance breakdown, and external security involvement.

South & Southeast Asia
Afghanistan · Bangladesh · Myanmar

Domestic instability here can interact with major trade flows, refugee pressures, and nearby power competition.

East Asia
North Korea

A high-consequence case — even a localized escalation could involve alliance systems and major-power response.

Latin America & the Caribbean
Haiti · Nicaragua · Venezuela

Risk here is less about direct great-power confrontation and more about state weakness, migration spillovers, economic disruption, and regional instability.

How to read this list: This is a model-threshold list, not an accusation list. It does not mean war is inevitable, these states will start a war, or that any specific actor has decided to pursue conflict. It means these countries are modeled as more vulnerable to amplifying a wider crisis if pressure spreads through trade routes, energy markets, food systems, migration, finance, cyber disruption, or outside military commitments.

Additional countries with later "war" thresholds

The model also shows when productive arrangements start to lose their hold in larger economies. These are not predictions of war — they signal rising structural stress.

CountryModel threshold year
Egypt2030
Russia2033
Türkiye2038
Tunisia2043
Eswatini2044
Ukraine2049
United States2049
South Africa2056

Where wider conflict is most likely to spread from

The most likely pathway is not a brand-new global war appearing suddenly. It is the widening of an existing regional crisis.

  1. An existing war or near-war crisis stays active
  2. Nearby states or outside powers become more directly involved
  3. Shipping or energy chokepoints are disrupted
  4. Food, fuel, cyber, or migration pressures spread outward
  5. A second or third theater stays active at the same time

That is how separate crises can become one connected conflict system.

Important limitations

  • The 18% figure is a judgment-based composite estimate, not an observed statistic or market price.
  • The game theory model is not a direct war-forecasting tool. It is better at identifying where resilience is thinning than at predicting exact dates or belligerents.
  • Short-horizon risk in 2026–2029 is driven mainly by live theaters, ceasefire fragility, alliance dynamics, chokepoints, and commodity shocks.
  • This is a stylized educational model, not an accusation against any named country, institution, or person.

Data sources

Cross-country model inputs: IMF AI Preparedness Index, UN E-Government Development Index, World Bank World Development Indicators, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and SIPRI military expenditure data where available.

U.S.-Specific: BLS Employment Situation for March 2026, BLS CPI for February 2026, Federal Reserve notes on AI adoption and on the international role of the dollar, IMF AI Preparedness Index, and Transparency International's CPI 2025 release for the United States.

Conflict-context update: Reuters and UN reporting on the April 2026 Middle East crisis, UCDP's 2025 update on 2024 conflict counts, and SIPRI's 2025 fact sheet on 2024 military expenditure.